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NETWORK NEUTRALITY GENERATES A CONTENTIOUS
DEBATE AMONG EXPERTS: SHOULD CONSUMERS BE
WORRIED?
Cody Vitello*
I. Introduction
t has been forty years since the invention of the Internet,' and
like any aging technology, the Internet is not immune to the
proverbial mid-life crisis. With 1.7 billion, or just over a fourth of
the world's population using the Internet,2 and with the expectation that Internet traffic will quadruple by the year 2013, 3 many
fear that the current antiquated system will not be able to support
the rising level of demand without some form of data discrimination.4 This concern is only exacerbated by the fact that active
mobile-phone Internet users have nearly doubled between 2006
and 2008.1 Popular economic literature is quick to point out that
J.D. Candidate, May 2011, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.
The Internet at Forty, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 4, 2009,
http://www.economist.com/science-technology/displaystory.cfm ?story-id=E 1
TQPJTRNN [hereinafter THE ECONOMIST]. Internet history will be discussed
in Part II.A. infra.
2
Internet
World
Stats, World
Internet Usage Statistics,
www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) [hereinafter
World Stats]. Of the 1.7 billion Internet users, 227 million are Americans. Internet World Stats, United States Internet Usage, www.internetworldstats.
com/am/us.htm (last visited Mar. 7, 2010) [hereinafter USA Stats].
I The Rights of Bits, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 24, 2009, available at
http://www.economist.com/businessfinance/displaystory.cfm?story-id=E1_TQ
VTSQNN [hereinafter Rights of Bits].
I See, e.g., Rights of Bits, supra note 3; THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1;
Avis Yates Rivers, Editorial, Network Neutrality; Hysteria Makes for Bad
Law, THE SEATTLE TIMES, Dec. 20, 2007, available at http://seattletimes.
nwsource.com/htmllopinion/2004083048_broadband2o.html; Tim Wu, Why
You Should Care About Network Neutrality, SLATE May 1, 2006,
http://www.slate.com/id/2140850/.
I THE NIELSEN CO., Critical Mass: The Worldwide State of the Mobile
Web,
(2008), available at http://nl.nielsen.com/site/documents/nielsen
mobile.pdf [hereinafter NIELSEN].
1
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any finite resource facing increasing levels of demand will have to
address its scarcity dilemma by imposing some form of allocation
mechanism.6
Such allocation mechanisms, or network-management
tools, employed by Internet service providers ("ISPs") to control
traffic on their infrastructure is at the core of the network neutrality debate.' Proponents of network neutrality ("proponents")
contend that Internet traffic manipulation can, and ultimately
will, adversely affect Internet users.' These proponents call for
the enactment of federal regulatory legislation that will mandate
ISPs to treat all Internet traffic alike without any form of data
discrimination.9 Conversely, network neutrality opponents ("opponents") contend that not only is data discrimination necessary,
but it is also beneficial to the consumer.10 These opponents argue
that our current regulatory framework will address unfair practices appropriately and any new legislation will only yield more
arm than good. 1
This article will look past the hysteria and contentious nature of the network neutrality debate and analyze the issue by focusing on the economic and consumer welfare implications resulting from either side's position. Part II of this article will review
the invention of the Internet and then proceed to discuss its modern-day relevance and ubiquitous impact on consumers. Part III
will introduce the U.S.'s regulatory oversight model of the Internet and conclude by briefly introducing the approaches taken by
other, similarly situated, nations. Part IV will focus on the development of the network neutrality debate, its various definitions,
and the views held by its advocates and proponents. Part V will
subject the network neutrality model to scrutiny by analyzing it
6 Christopher S. Yoo; Network Neutrality and the Economics of Congestion, 94 GEO. L.J. 1847, 1852 (2006) (suggesting usage-sensitive price as an allocation mechanism).
7 See Rivers, supra note 4.
' See generally Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R.
pt. 8); Wu, infra note 116; Frischmann and Schewick, infra note 35; Wu, supra
note 4.
9 See, e.g., Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 111th
Cong. (as referred to the H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, July 31,

2009).
10 See generally Yoo, supra note 6; FTC STAFF REPORT, infra note 17;
Chong, infra note 60.
" See generally Rivers, supra note 4; Rights of Bits, supra note 3; Chong,
infra note 60.
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from a broader consumer perspective. Additionally, Part V will
address the adequacy of our current regulatory system and the
economic, competitive, legal, and political effects of network neutrality. Finally, Part VI will introduce any future considerations
the network neutrality debate may precipitate.
II. The Internet
A fundamental understanding of the history, technological
workings, and impact of the Internet is necessary before proceeding; it is this understanding that sets the foundation for the network neutrality debate. Part II is apportioned into two sections;
Section A will discuss the invention and technological workings
of the Internet and Section B will put into perspective the ubiquitous impact of the modern-day Internet.
A. The Origins of the Internet
The invention of the Internet occurred over four decades
ago, on September 2, 1969, in Dr. Leonard Kleinrock's laboratory
when a project he and his colleagues had been working on for the
U.S. government successfully transmitted data from one computer to another over a 15-foot cable.' The government project was
funded by the U.S. Department of Defense Advanced Research
Projects Agency ("DARPA") to create a military internetwork,
known as "ARPANET," with the primary goal of connecting existing local area networks, despite their fundamental technological and architectural differences. 3 Secondarily, ARPANET had
seven other goals. 4 Of its secondary goals, survivability in the

12

THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.

See generally David D. Clark, The Design Philosophy of the DARPA
Internet Protocols, 25(1) COMPUTER COMM. REV., Aug. 1988 at 106 (1988),
available at http://www.cs.princeton.edu/courses/archive/fall04/cos318/docs/
p106-clark.pdf.
ARPANET's secondary goals were, in order of priority:
1. Internet communication must continue despite loss of networks or gateway. 2. The Internet must support multiple types
of communications service. 3. The Internet architecture must
accommodate a variety of networks. 4. The Internet architecture must permit distributed management of its resources. 5.
The Internet architecture must be cost effective. 6. The Internet architecture must permit host attachment with a low level
of effort. [And] 7. The resources used in the Internet architecture must be accountable. Id. at 107.
13
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face of failure was the most important. 5 Survivability was given
priority because DARPA, as a military institution, was concerned
with data interruption during wartime. 6 This goal led to various
non-linear techniques to permit computers to communicate with
each other. 7
By the late 1960s, computer scientists had developed
"packet-switching" techniques, allowing computers to communicate with each other over an interrupted network satisfying a
very important DARPA goal.' 8 Essentially, "packets" are variable-size pieces of data that an originating computer can disassemble and forward, over a network, to a receiving computer
where it will be reassembled and processed.19 Traditionally, circuit-switched networks (i.e. telephone networks) required a discrete connection and a dedicated line of communication for the
duration of the transmission to be successful.2 ° By contrast, packet-switched networks can disassemble larger electronic files into
packets, analogous to sending a letter in the mail, and transmit
them over an indiscrete or fragmented network. 1 Like a letter,
each packet has "an address on the front, a sequence code on the
back, and a chunk of the data inside... "22 This method of transmission allows a single file, disassembled into many packets, to
take multiple paths before reaching its final destination (even
though one packet may take a longer route than the others).23
4
This redundancy makes the network extremely robust.
With a proven method of transmission, computer scientists had to develop a way for local area networks to connect with
each other. This internetworking of networks (hence the term "Internet"2 ) was accomplished with the invention of the Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol ("TCP/IP") software
suite. 6 This dual-protocol suite independently disassembles and
,"Clark, supra note 13, at 107.

Id.
FTC STAFF REPORT, Broadband Connectivity Competition Policy,
June 2007 at 14, available at http://www.ftc.gov/reports/broadband/v07000O
report.pdf.
16

17

18

Id.

19 Id.
20 Id. at 14-15.
21 THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
22
23

Id.
Id.; FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 14-15.

24 THE ECONOMIST,

supra note 1.

25

Id.

26

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 15.
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reassembles the data packets (TCP component) and transmits the
data between sender and recipient computers (IP component). 7
Prior to TCP/IP, each network had its own method of transmission, but with the open-source and widely-available universal
TCP/IP suite that exists now, different local area networks could
now communicate with each other.2
Transmissions between networks utilizing the TCP/IP
suite travel between network routers.2 9 These network routers
then use a software algorithm to determine which packets go to
which links.30 The sooner the requisite link is free, for any given
packet, the sooner it is sent; however, if the requisite link is temporarily being used then it engages in a holding pattern, called
"buffering," until it can be sent.3 Additionally, if too many packets are simultaneously buffering in a single router's memory,
some of them will be dropped and never reach their destination.
There are two very critical components of the TCP/IP
suite that are at the very core of the network neutrality debate.
First, data packets transmitted via TCP/IP move through routers
on a "first-in-first-out" principle; and second, the transmission is
conducted on a "best-efforts" basis.3 Fundamentally, this means
that there is no prioritization between data packets; therefore,
there is no specific guarantee that any one packet will reach its
destination. 4 In other words, the networks are "dumb," or blind,
to what they are transmitting.3 5
Ultimately, two subsequent breakthroughs led to the revolution of the Internet. First, in 1991, the World Wide Web
("Web") was invented by two scientists at the European Centre
for Nuclear Research.3 6 The Web made navigating the Internet

27

Id.

28

THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.

29

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 16.

30

31

Id.
Id.

Id. This result also introduces the concept of scarcity and the need to
allocate resources over the amount of data that can be transferred through a
given router at a given time.
32

33 Id.
31

Id.

at 16-17.

"s Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and

the Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47
JURIMETRICS J. 383, 385-86 (2007). This concept is often referred to as the
"end-to-end" argument. Meaning infrastructure providers are unable to distinguish between the data packets traversing their networks. Id.
36

THE ECONOMIST, supra note 1.
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much simpler and. enabled website browsing, links, Web portals,
Web addresses, and other user-friendly amenities." The second
was the recognition that the Internet had massive potentials initiating an infusion of investment in the number of networks and
wirelines connecting the individual networks. This realization
effectively led to the Internet's privatization in 1995.11
B. The Modern Internet
Today, the Internet has evolved from its early stages and
is comprised of three types of interconnected networks.4 0 The first
category, Backbone Providers, supply long-distance high-speed
"connections between a small number of interconnection
points."4' 1 Second, there are Middle-Mile Providers who supply
regional distributive functions; for example, a connection from a
Backbone Provider to a distant city's central office maintained by
an ISP.42 Finally, there are Last-Mile Providers who connect
Middle-Mile Providers to end users (consumers).4 3 Although ISPs
were historically considered Last-Mile Providers, it is often the
case for broadband capable networks that the ISP is both the
Last-Mile Provider and the Middle-Mile. Provider." This system
of connected networks is most analogous to a road system: Backbones represent interstate highways; Middle-Mile networks are
the intrastate highways; and Last-Mile networks are the local
roads that ultimately reach consumers.4"
The Internet is unfathomably more dynamic and expansive than it was in its earlier days. In 1989, there was only one

Transcript of Symposium, infra note 127, at 19.
s Organizations such as the National Science Foundation, Computer
Science Researchers, DARPA/ARPANET, and Commercial Internet Exchange began investing in Internet backbone services to expedite the connection of all the various local area networks. FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note*17,

at 17-18.
11 Id. at 18-19.
10 The FCC has found it useful to designate Internet providers into three
categories. Yoo, supra note 6 at, 1860.
" Id. Originally there were only four connection points: San Francisco,
Chicago, New York, and Washington, D.C. Now there are more. Id. at 1860

n.64.
Id. at 1860.
4 Id. at 1861.
44 Id. at 1861 n.65.

42

41Id. at 1861.
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website; by 2006, this number had grown to over 100 million.46 Of
the world's 1.7 billion Internet users, or 26% of the world's population,4 7 227 million of them are U.S. citizens.4 8 Of those U.S. Internet users, the average person spends over 66 hours on the Web
every month. 49 To put this number into perspective, Google had
over 155 million Internet users, each spending an average of two
hours and twenty-four minutes, on its websites in November
2009.50 Comparatively, Facebook had 110 million users spending
an average of six hours and ten minutes.5' Perhaps unsurprisingly, the bulk of Internet bandwidth is not used to search the Internet's ever increasing supply of websites, but by users trading music, television shows, full-length movies, and playing online video
games.5 For example, YouTube "streams more data in three
months than all the world's radio stations plus cable and broadcast television channels stream in a year." 3 Finally, of the 95 million U.S.-mobile Internet subscribers in 2008, 40 million were active users, accounting for over $5 billion in total revenue in
2007.54 Eighty-two percent of all Apple iPhone users actively
access the Internet from their phones. 5 As smartphones become
more popular and cellular networks increase their data capabilities, this number can only be expected to increase.5 6 This perva-

46

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 19.

World Stats, supra note 2. This number is expected to quadruple by
2013. See Rights of Bits, supra note 3.
48 USA Stats, supra note 2. This comprises 74.1% of the U.S. population.
Comparatively, 52%, or 418 million Europeans and 19.4%, or 738 million
Asians are Internet users. World Stats, supra note 2.
49 THE NIELSEN CO., U.S. Web Users Spent Just Over 66 Hours on the
Computer in November, Dec. 14, 2009, [hereinafter Web Users]
http://blog.nielsen.com/nielsenwire/online-mobile/u-s-web-users-spent-justover-66-hours-on-the-computer-in-november/.
"

50

Id.

5 Id.
52

THE EcONOMIST, supra note 1.

53

Id.

54 NIELSEN,supra note

5. In July 2006 there were only 22.4 million active
mobile U.S. Internet users; thus, in two years this number has almost doubled.
Id.
55 Id.
56 Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74
Fed.
Reg. 62,638, 62,652-53 (proposed Nov. 30, 2009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt.
8). Since 2004, there have been more mobile telephone subscribers than landline subscribers. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. at 62,652-53. Some mobile Internet users use their phone as
their sole source of Internet access. Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband
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sive thirst for more Internet bandwidth has accelerated the network neutrality debate.
III. The Current Internet Regulatory Structure
Internet service providers are subject to the concurrent jurisdiction of the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC"),
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC"), and the Department of
Justice ("DOJ").18 This section will briefly discuss the jurisdic-

tional authority of the FCC in Section A, FTC in Section B, DOJ
in Section C, and conclude with an international comparative
approach in Section D. In-depth application and analysis of FCC,
FTC, and DOJ oversight will be reserved for Part V of this article
infra.
A. The Federal Communications Commission
The FCC's regulatory jurisdiction over the Internet is
primarily derived from the Communications Act, which in part
charges the FCC with "regulating interstate and foreign commerce in communication by wire and radio." 9 The Communications Act regulates telephone companies under Title II, imposing
common-carrier obligations.6" Common-carrier status mandates
telephone companies to open up their networks on a nondiscriminatory basis. 6' The FCC, however, has refused to apply commoncarrier status to Internet companies and instead has classified
them as "information services." 62
Industry Practices, 74 Fed. Reg. at 62,652-53; see also NIELSEN, supra note 5.
" If the demand for bandwidth increases faster than the supply of the
bandwidth provided to consumers then necessarily there will have to be data
discrimination. Either the network operator will have to allocate its scare resources according to a price-tier system or the routers will start to allocate resources on their own by dropping data packets altogether. See supra Part II.
58 FTC STAFF.REPORT, supra note 17, at 138; Press Release, Deborah Majoras, FTC Chairman, FTC Chairman Addresses Issue of "Net Neutrality"
(Aug. 21, 2006), availableat http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/08/neutrality.shtm.
" Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to the Internet over
Wireline Facilities, 20 F.C.C.R. 14,986, 14,987 (Policy Statement) [hereinafter
Wireline] (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 151).
I Rachelle B. Chong, The 31 Flavors of Net Neutrality: A Policymaker's
View, 12 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 147, 149 (2008).
61 Id. This is because, historically, telephone networks were monopolies
and it proved both costly and wasteful to run more than one telephone line to a
single consumer. Id.
62 Id. As shown in the next paragraph this is consistent with Congress' in-
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Congress has stated that "it is the policy of the United
States 'to preserve the vibrant and competitive free market that
presently exists for the Internet' and 'to promote the continued
development of the Internet."' 6 3 Further, Congress, when adopting the Telecommunications Act of 1996,64 directed the FCC to
"encourage the deployment on a reasonable and timely basis of
capability [broadband Internet] to
advanced telecommunications
65
Americans.
all
Pursuant to Congress' Internet policy, the FCC, under its
Title I ancillary jurisdiction,6 6 has adopted four guiding Internet
deployed,
principles to ensure broadband networks are widely
67
consumers:
all
to
accessible
and
affordable,
open,
[1] To encourage broadband deployment and preserve and promote the open and interconnected nature of the public Internet, consumers are entitled to
access the lawful Internet content of their
choice ....[2] [C]onsumers are entitled to run applications and use services of their choice, subject to
the needs of law enforcement... [3] [C]onsumers are
entitled to connect their choice of legal devices that
do not harm the network... [And 4] [C]onsumers are
entitled to competition among network providers,
application and service providers, and content providers.68
The FCC's expansive role was subsequently challenged and affirmed by the U.S. Supreme Court in its Brand X69 decision."

tent. Id at 150.

Wireline, supra note 59, at 14,987 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 230 (b)(1) and 47
U.S.C. § 230(b)(2)).
64 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. Law No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56
(1996)).
65 47 U.S.C. § 157 note.
66 "The Commission however, 'has jurisdiction to impose additional regulatory obligations under its Title I ancillary jurisdiction to regulate interstate
and foreign communications."' Wireline, supra note 59, at 14,987-88 (quoting
NCTA v. Brand X, slip op. at 3-4).
63

67 Id. at 14,988.

Id. (emphasis in original).
National Cable & Telecomms. Ass'n v. Brand X Internet Services, 545
U.S. 967, 996 (2005).
13 n.47 (order)
70 Broadband Industry Practices, 23 F.C.C.R. 13028,
("The Commission, under Title I of the Communications Act, has the ability to
68

69
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Thus, the FCC, exercising its Title I ancillary jurisdiction over
the past few years, has successfully unified the regulatory status
of wireline, cable, powerline, and wireless broadband Internet
services."
B. The Federal Trade Commission
The FTC's Internet regulatory oversight is derived primarily from the FTC Act72 and gives the Commission jurisdiction
over matters of consumer protection and competition.73 "Under
the FTC Act, '[u]unfair methods of competition in or affecting
commerce, and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce,' are prohibited. '7 4 An unfair act is one that "causes
or is likely to cause substantial injury to consumers which is not
reasonably avoidable by consumers themselves and not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition."75 It should be noted that had ISPs been classified as common carriers, the FTC would be precluded from exercising its
jurisdiction over their operations."
Finally, the FTC itself has announced that it is a commanding Internet regulator. More specifically, the FTC considers itself to have "both authority and experience in the enforcement of competition and consumer protection law provisions
pertinent to broadband Internet access," the flexibility from the
Act's intentional ambiguities to dynamically regulate diverse
markets, and the investigative and enforcement wherewithal to
appropriately address "party- and market-specific" operations. 8
C. The Department of Justice
Like the FTC, the DOJ can regulate the Internet through
the use of a proxy - existing antitrust laws.79 Although antitrust
adopt and enforce the net neutrality principles it announced in the Internet
Policy Statement."), available at http://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/system/files/
FccComcastOrder.pdf.
1' FTC STAFF REPORT, supranote 17, at 47.
72 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-58.
13

FTC

74

Id.

STAFF REPORT,

supra note 17, at 38.

15 U.S.C. § 45(n).
FTC STAFF REPORT, supranote 17, at 38.
11 Id. at 41.
78 Id.
11 Id. at 37 n.154. See also The Sherman Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 and The
71
76
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laws can be enforced ex post, the DOJ has been active in addressing ex ante anticompetitive issues by investigating Internet company mergers. For example, the DOJ investigated the AT&T and
BellSouth merger by exploring whether its consummation would
allow the company to favor its own content over that of its rivals
(ultimately finding that it did not).80 Similarly, the DOJ successfully sought from AT&T and SBC, prior to merging, the divestiture of certain assets as preconditions for the agency's approval."
D. Regulation Outside the United States
Although largely outside the scope of this article, a short
overview of how some other countries have adopted Internet regulations may serve useful to the reader's perspective. South Korea, often cited as the most "wired" country in the world, privatized its Internet giant, Korea Telecom, in the early 1990s and has
pushed for public-private partnerships in funding national
projects.82 Initially, South Korea saw the emergence of multiple
ISPs before they began converging ultimately requiring government price controls. 83 Like South Korea, Japan privatized its historic telecommunications monopoly and started focusing on ex
post regulation rather than the ex ante regulation it was implementing via licenses and approval.84 Alternatively, German ISPs
have actually implemented several varying pricing plans, such as:
pay-per-minute, pay-per-bandwidth, and flat-rate.' Finally, the
Netherlands, Europe's leader in broadband penetration, has
largely deregulated its Internet industry but still provides the industry with subsidies and tax breaks to further promote telecommunications infrastructure.86
IV. A Network Neutrality Introduction
This part of the article introduces the nuts and bolts of
what network neutrality proponents identify as the central issue.
Section A will briefly provide the backdrop from which network

Clayton Antitrust Act 15 U.S.C. §§ 12-27, 29 U.S.C. §§ 52-53.
80 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 49 n.219.
81 Id. at 48 n.218.
82 Id. at 113.

Id. at 114.
Id. at 115, n.553.
s' Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 396.
86 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 117-18.
83
84
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neutrality proponents contend the need for reform, and Section B
will attempt to identify the many types of behavior deemed not
neutral, and argued to be prohibited, by proponents.
A. Origin of the Concern
Network neutrality advocates first began to aggressively
advance their call for national neutral-Internet legislation when,
in February and March of 2002, the FCC classified Digital Subscriber Lines ("DSL") and cable modem systems as "information
systems."8 7 This classification allowed broadband ISPs to foreclose their proprietary networks to competitors. 8 Consequently,
some ISPs began charging tiered pricing models to require heavy
bandwidth users to pay more for their network connection.8 9 Others began limiting connection speeds of users running bandwidthintensive programs. 0 Some ISPs imposed restrictions that prohibited "end users [from] reselling bandwidth... engaging in home
networking, attaching certain devices, operating file servers, and
employing commercial applications such as virtual private networks."91
With the potential for ISPs to manipulate their networks
in unprecedented ways and the Internet user's unsatiated appetite for more bandwidth, many companies fear that they inevitably will bear some sort of loss as bandwidth is managed and congestion is allocated accordingly. In fact, companies such as
Google11 Disney, Amazon.com, eBay, Yahoo!, Microsoft, Apple
Computer, and Dell have formed several industry consortia to
protest and combat what they perceive as newly found ISP power.93 It was not long before legal scholars started engaging in the
debate, publishing scholarly articles for and against a federal law
that would mandate Internet-neutral ideals, such as the FCC's
four network neutral principles discussed in Part III.A. supra.

s Yoo, supra note 6, at 1856; see also Frischmann and Schewick, supra
note 35, at 387.
88 See supra Part HI.A.
89 Yoo, supra note 6, at 1856.
90 Id.
91 Id.
92 Jessica E. Vascellaro, Google to Test Ultra-FastBroadband, THE WALL
ST. J., Feb. 11, 2010, http:lonline.wsj.com/article/SB3000142405274870
4140104575057273487119574.html.
93 Yoo, supra note 6, at 1857.
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B. Defining Non-Neutral Behavior
Network neutrality proponents come in all shapes and sizes, but most of them can agree on a limited set of principles that
they aggressively advocate as necessary for the continuation of a
"free" Internet. It should be noted that proponents and opponents
are not always clear on whether their concerns are applicable to
the national ISP market, regional markets only, or both. 4 Generally, network neutrality proponents convey concern over: (1) Internet degradation, prioritization, and blockage of content and
applications; (2) price discrimination ("tiering"); (3) ISPs vertically
integrating with content and application providers; (4) effects on
innovation by content and application providers; (5) diminution
of Last-Mile ISPs; (6) lack of Internet regulatory oversight; and
(7) diminution of free expression.95
First, data degradation, prioritization, and blockage are
thought to be inevitable without neutrality rules.96 Proponents are
concerned that ISPs will use data discrimination technologies to
restrict their subscribers from rival content instead of offering unfettered access to the entire Internet.17 They fear that this kind of
behavior will lead to Internet balkanization. 8 The end result
might resemble an Internet analogous to contemporary cabletelevision service where you are given access to a standard set of
channels, but must pay to receive premium content.99 For example, in 2005, a small ISP, Madison River Telephone Company,
was investigated by the FCC for allegedly blocking from its customers a rival voice over Internet protocol ("VoIP") company in
favor of its own. 00 Madison River and the FCC reached a consent decree stating it would not block its data ports to VoIP providers and would pay a fine to the U.S. Treasury for its actions.10'
Second, proponents are fearful that ISPs will invoke price
tiering arrangements that limit bandwidth relative to the price
9' Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 419 (Authors confront a network neutrality opponent for focusing on the national market rather than,
what they think is the relevant market, the local market).
91 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 52; Yoo, supra note 6, at 188385.
96 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 52.
97 Id.
98 Id. at 52, 79.

11 Id. at 52.
1o Chong, supra note 60, at 152; See In re Madison River Commc'ns, 20
F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
101 Chong, supra note 60, at 152.
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the customer is willing to pay for the service.10 2 These proponents
argue that if ISPs are allowed to charge more money for service
agreements that guarantee more bandwidth, then this will necessarily create "fast lanes" for wealthy consumers and slow lanes for
the common consumer.' 3 Ostensibly, they argue, this appears satisfactory; but proponents nevertheless fear that by limiting
bandwidth to the common consumer it will prevent these consumers from accessing and utilizing bandwidth-intensive applications and content - thereby reducing those companies' profits and
thus, incentives to innovate. 1°4 Alternatively, other proponents
fear that ISPs will charge program and content providers tiered
pricing in exchange for more bandwidth. 15 In sum, these proponents object to any "deviation from the long-standing first-infirst-out and best-efforts transmission characteristics of the Internet."'0 6 This in turn, the argument goes, would prohibit bandwidth-intensive-startup companies from gaining access to potential customers if they could not afford to foot the bill." 7
Third, vertical integration - where a company merges or
expands its operations into its supply or distributive markets has also recently concerned many neutrality proponents.1 08 These
neutrality proponents fear that once - or if - ISPs expand operations into content and application industries they will then have
the incentive to prioritize their own data packets at the expense of
others, 10 9 thereby allowing them to charge monopoly prices." 0
Consequently, some proponents seek an outright ban on ISPs
from vertically integrating."1
Fourth, proponents are concerned about the effects a nonneutral Internet would have on innovation." 2 These proponents
desire to increase incentives for independent companies to innovate by prohibiting restrictions."' To illustrate, they fear "the
102 See FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 54.
103 Chong, supra note 60, at 154.
104

Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 404.

'o'

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 54.

Id.
"o' See Yoo, supra note 6 at, 1881.
106

101FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 57.
109 Id.

"o Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 411. For a detailed explanation of the potential economic effects of vertical integration by ISPs see id. at
410-16.
"I
112

113

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 57.

Id.
Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 419.
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complexity and cost that content and application providers would
experience if they had to negotiate deals with numerous network
operators worldwide" would be prohibitive. 114 Similarly, they are
concerned that spontaneous innovators, nonprofits, and educational entities might be prevented from fully capitalizing their
business absent potentially preclusive negotiations with an established network operator."' From a macroeconomic standpoint,
restricting innovation is alleged to significantly reduce economic
growth." 6
Fifth, proponents express concern over the access the average consumer will have to choose between ISP companies." 7
Generally, the argument assumes that most Internet consumers
have access only to two broadband-ISP companies - the local cable and phone companies.1 8 It next assumes that emerging technologies such as wireless or powerline ISPs, will not, in the near
future, be able to compete with the cable or phone companies." 9
The argument then focuses on inadequate competition, alternatives, and disclosure that would result from a de facto duopoly in
the local ISP market and attempts2 0to prevent this from occurring
in the Last-Mile Provider market.
Sixth, neutrality proponents argue the current regulatory
21
framework is insufficient to effectively engage their concerns. '
Proponents are not convinced the FCC's Title I authority or the
antitrust and consumer protection authorities underthe FTC and
DOJ are capable of preventing their concerns from materializing. 122 This is the primary thrust proponents use to rally supporters into adopting federal
legislation to mandate their version of a
"neutral" Internet. 2 3

114
Ill

116

FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 57.
Id. at 58.
Frischmann & Schewick, supra note 35, at 424; Tim Wu, Testimony

Draft, The Installationand Use of FilteringSoftware on Public Networks Contradicts U.S. Policy, available at http://www.fcc.gov/broadbandnetwork_
management/022508/wu.pdf. Of course, the fear that economic growth will be
stifled disappears if the Internet remains "neutral."
117 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 58.
1I Id.
119 Id.
120 See
1

122

Id. 58-59.
Id. at 59.
Id.; See Part III supra.

See, e.g., Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 11 1th
Cong. (as referred to the H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, July 31,
123

2009).
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Seventh, proponents are concerned that if ISPs have the
ability to filter their traffic, or data packets, then they may prevent content on their network that runs counter to their objectives.12 4 Although analogous to any other type of content restriction, this argument invokes the First Amendment as a legal
prohibition from choking political discourse.1 25 In sum, this is an
additional reason, proponents contend, to prevent ISPs from restricting content on their networks.
Finally, it should be noted that other network neutrality
proponents seek legislation to prohibit restrictions by ISP companies: from consumers reselling bandwidth; on home networking;
on attaching devices; and operating file servers. 26 Underlying this
argument is that once a consumer purchases an Internet connection from an ISP they have the right to dispose of it, and utilize it,
any way they see fit as long as it is not illegal, detrimental to other
users, or detrimental to the network's infrastructure.
V. Network Neutrality Scrutinized
In order to properly analyze the arguments that network
neutrality proponents advocate, it is useful to analyze their claims
by focusing on assessments consumers should be most concerned
with. Section A will evaluate network neutrality from a consumer-centric welfare approach. Section B will evaluate network neutrality from an economic and regulatory view. Lastly, Section C
will address any potential legal hurdles and the political feasibility of implementing a national network neutrality law.
A. Consumer Welfare Analysis
Consumer welfare can be vague and the term necessarily
generalizes in order to encompass a larger base. For purposes of
this article, consumer welfare will merely analyze whether the
consumer is better or worse off after the proposed rule, regulation, or deviation from the status quo is adopted and implemented.
First, an ISP's network value is directly related to the
amount of consumers and companies subscribing to it or conducting business over it.1 27 Thus, ISPs already have a built-in incensupra note 17, at 59-60.
See Id. at 60 n.268.
See Yoo, supra note 6, at 1876-79.
Transcript of Symposium at 10, THE
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125
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tive to make pro-consumer choices and to refrain from alienating
current and potential customers. 8 Second, contrary to what network neutrality proponents care to admit, the Internet is and always has been inherently discriminatory. 129 Due to Internet congestion, data packets are routinely queued, buffered, dropped, or
rerouted as they traverse multiple networks from their originating location to their destination location. 3 °
In fact, this is the reason large Internet content and application companies set up multiple server locations called "content
delivery networks" to duplicate their data (despite their redundancy, they ensure their data packets arrive quicker and with
fewer errors).13 ' Content delivery networks violate, at their core,
the principles of network neutrality. 132 They essentially game the
system to favor their data packets over others. Some proponents
would actually favor the elimination of content delivery networks
because they violate the "dumb" network routers of twenty years
ago. 133 This behavior seems to stifle innovation more than protect
it. Would consumers really want to wait longer, with a higher
probability of error, for the content they seek to access over the
Internet because large commercial Internet entities are willing to
pay more for a content delivery network?
Similarly, forbidding price tiering arrangements would only harm the consumer. By allowing private parties to contract -

FOUNDATION, Net Neutrality or Net Neutering: Should Broadband Internet

Services
Be
Regulated?,
(Oct.
2006),
http://www.pff.org/issuespubs/pops/pop13.26 net neutrality-transcript.pdf. Some economists consider
the Internet a "club good." This means that although its value increases with
membership, there is a limit to this value as membership surpasses equilibrium. Yoo, supra note 6, at 1864. This can be illustrated by realizing that the
Internet is more useful relative to the more users accessing it. However, too
many users will actually start to create a degrading negative externality on
other users in the form of a slower connection. Id.
1"8 Transcript of Symposium, supra note 127, at 10; Chong, supra note 60,
at 152.
129 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 61.
"I Id.; Yoo, supra note 6, at 1862. Additionally, "beneficial practices, such
as backbone peering, content delivery networks like Akamai, network-based
spam filtering, and blocking websites known to be the source of viruses, attest
to the extent to which the Internet is already far from 'neutral'." Yoo, supra
note 6, at 1854.
131 Id. at 1881-82. The leading content delivery network, Akamai, maintains more than 14,000 servers and-handles more than 15% of the world's Internet content. Id. at 1882.
132

Id.

113

Id. at 1883.
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whether they are an Internet content/application provider or a
consumer - for the range of bandwidth they want (or as a metered approach) will increase the number of people able to benefit
from the network's services. 134 Not only should these private contracts be condoned but they should be encouraged. An ISP that
has several price tiering plans may be able to profitably allow a
discounted plan below what a flat rate ISP could provide by
making up the difference on their high usage customers. 35 As one
California Public Utilities Commissioner advanced when addressing premium service fees:
[T]his argument has baffled me. Some people are
perfectly fine with mailing a letter for 41 cents with
the U.S. Post Office and having it arrive two to three
days later. Other folks are in a rush and need to get
their letter their faster. So they are willing to pay $12
to get their letters their overnight... Different users
have different needs, and the market should be free
136
to serve all needs.
Additionally, a ban on price tiering would reduce consumer welfare because it would discourage upstart content providers
from "developing real-time applications by virtue of the uncertainty over their ability to contract for priority with access providers. '137 For example, if a medical provider wanted to provide
real-time-out-patient monitoring over the Internet they would be
unlikely to do so unless they could guarantee their monitoring
services would be allocated sufficient bandwidth to adequately
and properly care for their patients. Thus, any business that must
operate with a certain level of bandwidth would necessarily be
violating network neutrality principles and be precluded from the
market.
Data prioritization, blockage, and management can actually increase consumer welfare. Not all data packets should be

134

Id. at 1885.

135

Id.

136

Chong, supra note 60, at 154. See also FTC STAFF

REPORT,

supra note

17, at 64 (Other analogous examples include: first-class versus coach airline
tickets, private versus public transportation, and premium advertising locations).

.137 F. Gregory Sidak, A Consumer-Welfare Approach to Network Neutrality Regulation of the Internet, 2(3) J. OF COMPETITION L. AND EcONOMICS 349,

355 (2006).
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treated equally. Data packets that rely on reaching their destination at concurrent or sequential times should be given preference
138
to those that are not operating under similar time constraints.
To illustrate, voice and video streaming data packets should be
given preference to email and webpage data packets because the
former are sensitive to jitter and latency issues that can severely
decrease their quality and applicability. 13 9 Network neutrality
would require both types of data packets to be transmitted on a
first-in-first-out and best-efforts basis, but ISPs should be allowed
to identify, in the face of congestion, those that can afford to buffer from those that cannot. This type of network management
will actually enhance consumer welfare.
Network management is crucial to the proper functioning
of networks and it may be forbidden if certain neutrality proponents get their way. The FCC has recognized that network management is important by stating that its broadband principles are
"subject to reasonable network management."' 4 One way in
which ISPs manage their network, while simultaneously increasing consumer welfare, is by blocking viruses, spam, intentional
congestion, and reserving portions of bandwidth to resolve performance issues.' Carried to its logical conclusion, proponents
seek to forbid ISPs from eliminating viruses from their networks
because it would require them to filter the data packets traversing
its infrastructure. Admittedly, this is unlikely to happen, but
what kind of definition will the ISP adopt when searching for,
and eliminating, viruses, spam, and unwanted advertisements
and will it violate neutrality rules favored by proponents?
Moreover, it has been predicted that if YouTube becomes
a high-definition video player then it, by itself, will double the
capacity needs of the Internet. 142 To be clear, in an effort to maintain customers and to attract new ones, ISPs already have adequate incentives to increase the capacity of their networks, but
inevitably the capacity demanded by consumers and the infrastructure necessary to achieve that capacity does not appear instantaneously; thus, ISPs must make decisions on how to best
manage their networks during processes of expansion.143

138

FTC

STAFF REPORT, supra note 17,

"I Id. at 62.

at 64.

Chong, supra note 60, at 153.
at 153-54.
142 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 86.
143See Id. at 86-88.
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B. Regulatory, Economic, and Competitive Effects
If existing regulations are insufficient to govern the Internet without adversely affecting innovation, competition, and consumer welfare then it begs the question: "How did the Internet
become a colossal success story?' 4 Quite simply, the answer is
the free market structure and government regulation forbearance
worked.14 5 There is no lack of Internet content and applications;
as of 2006, there were upwards of 1,400 broadband providers in
the U.S. alone, providing Internet access via cable modems, DSL,
fiber-optic, and wireless to over 80% of all residents.1 46 These
facts are opponents' best argument. They contend that network
operators "should be allowed to innovate freely and differentiate
their networks as a form of competition that will lead to enhanced service offerings for content and applications providers
and other end users."'4 7 The idea is simple, if ISPs want to test out
different data transmission methods with a variety of business
plans, they should be allowed to do so and "if such experiments
turn out to be a failure, network operators will learn from their
mistakes and improve their offerings or simply return to the sta' 14
tus quo. 8

144
Rachelle Chong, a commissioner of the California Public Utilities
Commission, has answered this question by stating: "let's remember that a free
market structure has promoted the growth of the Internet. The Internet is a
tremendous success story. The government has used forbearance in regulating
the Internet, and it has worked." Chong, supra note 60, at 155. Indeed, Gregory
Sidak, a visiting professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, criticized network neutrality proponents' lack of recognition of the Internet's success when he wrote: "Given what is at stake in terms of consumer welfare, the
arguments offered in favor of network neutrality regulation have, to date, exhibited a staggering lack of economic rigor." Sidak, supra note 137, at 352.
'4

Chong, supra note 60, at 155.

Id. See also Sidak, supra note 137, at 473. Additionally, Internet Backbone providers remain competitive to this day due to large customers purchasing service from several ISPs to ensure that if any one of them changes their
subscription to unfavorable terms they can quickly substitute them for another
service provider. Nicholas Economides, The Economics of the Internet Backbone, in THE ECONOMICS OF THE INTERNET 375, 384 (2d ed. 2007), available
at http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/EconomidesECONOMICSOFTHE
-INTERNETBACKBONE.pdf.
147 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, 65.
14 Id. Gregory Sidak, a visiting professor of law at Georgetown University Law Center, has summed up the markets historic approach to the Internet
by stating:
[D]eregulation was the catalyst for substantial innovation with146
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Moreover, fostering innovation will allow smaller companies to compete with the incumbent mega ISPs. 149 Smaller companies rely on market differentiation to attract customers, despite
the expansive economies of scale by the larger ISPs. 1 50 These
smaller ISPs survive by offering products specifically tailored for
smaller subsegments of the overall market analogous to the survivability of a neighborhood boutique store when a Wal-Mart is
within the same community. 151 Additionally, the increase in competition by smaller ISPs will only increase the quality of services
offered by the mega ISP wishing to expand its customer base.152
Network neutrality laws would prohibit this amelioration and
innovation from ever taking place. Proponents often seem to forget that it was the competitive free market that created the Internet in the first place.
To be fair, not every ISP has attempted only procompetitive and consumer-welfare-enhancing business innovations. There are two examples that network neutrality proponents
often point to and say, "See, I told you so!'1 5 3 The first case was in
2005 and involved a small local telephone company, Madison
River Communications, which blocked its DSL customers from
using a commonly known rival VoIP, Vonage.154 However, the
FCC acted swiftly and reached a Consent Decree with Madison
River imposing a small "voluntary" payment to the U.S. Treasury
and a release from blocking its ports. 5 5 The second case was in
2008 and involved the second largest ISP, Comcast, when it bein the network, leading to improvements in investment, broadband penetration, broadband pricing, and broadband deployment. The deregulatory environment has also fostered innovation at the edges of the network, resulting in increased
investment, applications, and subscribership. Given the
amount of innovation within the network and at the edges of
the network, it seems improbable that the current deregulatory
regime has produced a socially suboptimal level of innovation.
Yet even if one assumes, counterfactually, that the actual
amount of innovation is less than socially optimal, it is doubtful that telecommunications law would be the most efficacious
instrument to address the alleged market failure. Sidak, supra
note 137, at 354.
141 Yoo, supra note 6, at 1904.
150

Id.

151Id.
152Id.

"I3Sidak, supra note 137, at 415.
154

155

Yoo, supra note 6, at 1857.
See Madison River Comm., LLC, Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 4295 (2005).
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gan choking the bandwidth used by bandwidth-intensive peer-topeer applications. 5 6 Again, the FCC acted by ordering Comcast
to cease and desist its data choking practices.'57 The take-away
lesson from these two cases is not that ISPs are incentivized to
engage in discriminatory practices, but that when an ISP experiments with data management that ultimately discriminates and
harms consumers, our current regulatory regime will quickly act
to remedy the situation. Contrary to what proponents advocate,
these cases do not corroborate their stance but instead reinforce
the belief that no further regulatory intrusion is required.
Finally, an outright prohibition on vertical integration will
decrease consumer welfare.'58 First, preventing ISPs from vertically integrating with content and application providers will prevent them from realizing economies of scope which, under a
competitive model, will increase their costs and prevent the ISP
from transferring its savings onto its consumer.'59 Second, this
kind of outright prohibition would also preclude ISPs from alternative sources of revenue, namely advertising, which would be
passed onto the consumer. 6 ° Further, a ban on vertical integration would "increase transaction costs and shield incumbent providers of content and applications from entry by network operators."'61 In other words, content and application markets would
face less competition resulting in fewer viable substitutes of their
products allowing them to increase their prices and profit to the
detriment of consumers.'62 If this result seems paradoxical to
what neutrality proponents claim they are advocating, that is because it is.

Again, to be fair, not every single vertically integrated
merger, partnership, or cooperation is going to yield pro consumer results. 163 In recognition of this we have the federal antitrust
laws enforced by the FTC and the DOJ. The FTC has stated: "In
conducting an antitrust analysis, the ultimate issue would be

156

See Broadband Industry Practices, supra note 70.
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Id. at

158

Sidak, supra note 137, at 356.

159
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54-55.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 459.
Originally the antitrust laws were skeptical of the consumer welfare
benefits of vertical integration, but began to slowly realize that its atomistic
vision of competition was actually increasing prices. Yoo, supra note 6, at
1886.
163 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 125.
161
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whether broadband Internet access providers engage in unilateral
or joint conduct that is likely to harm competition and consumers
in a relevant market."16' 4 The FTC and DOJ regulate the Internet
no differently than any other industry - ex ante regulation in the
merger context and ex post investigation and prosecution of anticompetitive practices. 6 5 That is to say:
Conduct that has the potential to be both anticompetitive and harmful to consumers, under certain
conditions, and procompetitive and capable of improving efficiency, under other conditions, is analyzed under the 'rule of reason' to determine the
net effect of such conduct on consumer welfare. In
contrast, conduct that is always or almost always
is deemed per se
harmful to consumers... generally
166
illegal under the antitrust laws.
The net effect is simple, the FTC and DOJ will vigorously
analyze ISP mergers, unilateral conduct, and agreements on a
case-by-case basis to ensure consumer welfare is not harmed by
vertical integration, horizontal integration, or otherwise. 67 For
example, when AOL 6 and Time Warner 169 merged, many feared
it would reduce AOL's incentive to offer DSL broadband service
as a cheaper alternative to cable.' The FTC acted by negotiating
a consent order, requiring the merged company to open up its caISPs and banned it from interfering with
ble system to competitor
7
their use of its lines.1 '
In addition to antitrust regulation, the FTC regulates consumer protection laws by prohibiting "entities from engaging in

16

Id. at 120. "The antitrust laws are grounded in the principle that com-

petition . . .serves to protect consumer welfare. This persistent focus on the

consumer ensures that enforcement resources are directed at protecting consumers through the competitive process, not at protecting individual market
players." Id.
16

Id. at 121.

Id.
Id. at 121-22. "[A]ntitrust jurisprudence generally regards vertical integration as harmless or beneficial to consumer welfare." Id. at 125.
168 At the time, AOL was the nation's largest ISP. Id. at 126.
169 At the time, Time Warner served approximately 20% of U.S. cable
166

167

households. Id.
170Id.
171

Id.
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unfair or deceptive acts or practices in interstate commerce. "172
Relating the FTC's consumer protection laws to ISPs, two issues
become prominent: (1) disclosure of material terms; and (2) privacy related issues." The FTC maintains any term that is "likely to
affect [consumers'] choice of, or conduct regarding a product" is
material and enforceable. 17 4 At the same time, the FTC requires
companies "to provide the privacy and security protections they
advertise and has brought approximately a dozen cases alleging
' 75
that failure... in violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act.'
The resounding message, by this point, should be clear:
not only have network neutrality proponents failed to examine
the economic and consumer welfare consequences of their proposed legislation, but they also have failed to adequately account
for the protective measures currently offered by the regulatory
authorities already in place. These material mistakes are compounded by proponents' continued failure to account for emerging Internet technologies, such as, wireless, fiber optic, and powerline ISPs to directly compete with incumbent ISPs.
Proponents wrongfully argue as though the ISP industry is static
and unable to adapt to market influences. Simply viewing the
progress of the Internet over the last forty years alone is enough
to rebut this proposition and raise serious doubts about the assumptions proponents premise their arguments upon.
C. Legal Hurdles and Political Feasibility
Disregarding the alleged anticompetitive and consumerwelfare-decreasing aspects of network neutrality, proposed legislation may face significant legal and political hurdles. Opponents
have raised the issue of whether neutrality legislation may misuse
the First Amendment right to free speech and violate the Fifth
Amendment right to have your property seized by the govern-

Id. at 129. The FTC has defined prohibited acts: "[An] act or practice is
deceptive if it involves a representation, omission, or practice that is likely to
mislead consumers acting reasonably under the circumstances, and the representation, omission, or practice is material." Id. Additionally, the FTC has defined unfair practices as those that cause injury to consumers that "(1) is substantial; (2) is not outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers and
competition; and (3) consumers themselves could not reasonably have
avoided." Id.
"I Id. at 130.
174 Id. at 131.
175 Id. at 134-35.
172
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ment without due process of law.Y16 Neutrality proponents argue
that a non-neutral Internet could prohibit political discourse and
violate the First Amendment, but the first Amendment only "protects the right to express one's viewpoint, but it does not entitle
one to use media of communications ...for free."' 77 Carried to its
logical conclusion, network neutrality would prohibit network
managers from filtering out spam, unsolicited pop-up advertisements, or viruses as a violation of the First Amendment. Furthermore, ISPs have invested enormous amounts of capital to
create their infrastructure and, as a consequence, own it and
should be allowed to reasonably dispose of their property how
they see fit.'7 8 Restricting ISPs from managing their proprietary
networks may constitute a taking, invoking the Fifth Amendment
and necessitate just compensation.7 9 As already stated, the goal
ought to be to encourage, not discourage, innovation and competition in Internet industries. The message here is that enacting ex
ante legislation to mandate neutral networks might have severe
unintended and unforeseen consequences. Not to mention the legislation may be totally unnecessary.
Remember, the current regulatory framework has. not
been shown to be inadequate. This is precisely the reason that
passing a federal statute mandating network neutral ideals may
not be politically feasible. As of June 2007, there have been over
twenty hearings in the Senate Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committee and six in the House Committee on Energy and
Commerce over network neutrality.Y0 In fact, network neutrality
is credited with preventing comprehensive telecom reform from
being enacted in the 109th Congress.' Similarly, the 110th Congress considered network neutral legislation but ultimately did
8 2
not pass anything.
VI. Future Considerations
If there is one thing that remains certain when addressing
the network neutrality debate it is its resilience to abscond anyTranscript of Symposium, supra note 127, at 6.
Sidak, supra note 137, at 438.
'"
178 How. ISPs manage and manipulate their networks remains subject to
all applicable laws and the jurisdiction of the FCC, FTC, and DOJ.
17 See Sidak, supra note 137, at 375-77, 376 n.89.
180 FTC STAFF REPORT, supra note 17, at 145 n.730.
176

181 Id. at 146-47.
182

Id.
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time soon. On July 31, 2009, Representative Markey of Massachusetts introduced H.R. 3458 into the 111 th Congress which was
then referred to the Committee on Energy and Commerce. 183 H.R.
3458, amongst many other network neutral ideals, would prohibit
ISPs from: blocking or interfering with any lawful content or application; imposing any charge on Internet content beyond the
monthly service fee; preventing users from attaching any lawful
device; selling content, applications, or other services to any affiliate to prioritize traffic; and from managing their network in
ways that impede compliance with the bill. 18 4 Even more recently,
the FCC, on November 30, 2009, issued a Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking ("NPRM") embodying "soft" network neutrality
ideals. 185 If adopted, the November 30th NPRM would essentially
codify the FCC's Internet principles discussed in Part III.A. supra.86 Finally, The Wall Street Journal reported on February 10,
2010, that Google Inc., a network neutrality advocate, is going to
build an experimental fiber-optic network in several cities and offer it directly to consumers or through another ISP. 187 Google
maintains that it will open the network up to any provider and
s8
will not discriminate the traffic that it carries.'
It appears that increasing consumer welfare in the Internet
context is a game played by taking two steps forward and one
step back. Both Google's experimental project and the FCC's
November 30th NPRM are great examples of pro consumer initiatives achieved through increasing innovation, competition, and
by enhancing FCC enforcement. Conversely, H.R. 3458 threatens
this progress by stifling ISP autonomy, innovation, and incentives
to invest enormous capital in systems that will not generate a viable return to justify the initiative. Fortunately, H.R. 3458 will
likely suffer the same fate of similar bills previously introduced
and die a quiet death to the benefit of consumers.
VII.. Conclusion
The Internet has undoubtedly had a profound impact on

'8
Internet Freedom Preservation Act of 2009, H.R. 3458, 11 1th Cong. (as
referred to the H.R. Comm. on Energy and Commerce, July 31, 2009).
184 Id. at § 12(b).
185 See Preserving the Open Internet, Broadband Industry Practices, 74
Fed. Reg. 62,638 (proposed Nov. 30, 1009) (to be codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 8).
116 See Id. at 62,645.

' Vascellaro, supra note 92.
188 Id.
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the world since its introduction almost forty-one years ago, and it
continues to expand, experiencing the occasional growing pain.
Some of these growing pains have generated mass hysteria. Network neutrality exemplifies an uncomfortable transition in the
Internet's history for many; but, under the current U.S. regulatory framework, the speculative fears of network neutrality proponents create far more harm than good to consumer welfare. After
all, hysteria makes for bad policy - carrying a propensity for unintended and unforeseen adverse consequences. Proponents need
to remind themselves that the Internet was invented and advanced into its current state with minimal government intervention. Further, any anti-consumer deviation since the Internet's
inception has been swiftly dealt with and remedied by existing
regulators. Despite all of this, proponents, naively, want to enact
an over expansive bill that, ironically, will hurt the very consumers they vocally attest to protect. Sometimes the hardest action to
take in the face of uncertainty is to take none at all. It appears
that neutrality opponents might be correct when they claim,
"network neutrality is a solution in search of a problem."'8 9

189 Rivers, supra note 4.

